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Using bilateral migration flow data from the 2010 popu-
lation census of Nepal, this paper provides evidence on 
the importance of public infrastructure and services in 
determining migration flows. The empirical specification, 
based on a generalized nested logit model, corrects for the 
non-random selection of migrants. The results show that 
migrants prefer areas that are nearer to paved roads and have 
better access to electricity. Apart from electricity's impact on 
income and through income on migration, the econometric 
results indicate that migrants attach substantial amenity 
value to access to electricity. These findings have important 
implications for the placement of basic infrastructure proj-
ects and the way benefits from these projects are evaluated.
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Introduction
Do migrants respond to di¤erences in access to public goods and services in addition to income prospects
of potential destinations? The income di¤erence between the origin and the destination is the primary factor
driving migration in the existing literature on migration (Greenwood (1975) and Borjas (1994), Lall, Selod
and Shalizi (2006)). Along with income, recent literature has also highlighted the importance of migration
costs as well as migrantsnetworks in determining migration ows. How provision of public goods and
services may inuence migration in poorer developing countries remains sparsely studied. This issue is
however important in these countries where provision of public goods varies widely across areas. In a
Tiebout (1956) sorting model, such disparity in the provision of public goods such as roads, electricity,
schools, hospitals, etc. should induce people to "vote with their feet" and to migrate to areas with better
access to these infrastructures and services.1
From a policy perspective, it is important to know how migration responds to the provision of public
goods in developing countries for a number of reasons. First, regions within a typical developing country
are usually characterized by stark di¤erences in poverty and welfare. Households with poorer attributes
such as low levels of education, skills and assets are frequently observed to live in poor areas that are
characterized by lack of public infrastructure and services (Shilpi(2011), Dudwick et al. (2011), World
Development Report (2009), Kanbur and Venables (2005), Jalan and Ravallion (2002), Ravallion and
Wodon (1999)). If migrants do respond to income as well as provision of public infrastructure and services,
then migration can act as a powerful instrument in mitigating regional di¤erences in welfare. Second,
di¤erential costs of provision of infrastructure and services along with a hard budget constraint often force
governments in developing countries to prioritize placement of these public goods. If people do migrate to
gain better access to public goods, then the government may be able to rely more on cost considerations to
prioritize their placement. Finally, migration in response to public goods and services also has important
implications for the way the benets of public investment are evaluated. A typical evaluation strategy
1Bayoh, Irwin and Haab (2006) nds that central citys inferior public goods, most notably school quality, play a dominant
role in pushing households in the USA metropolitan cities to suburban locations.
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of relying on variations in key outcomes such as income or household expenditure across areas with and
without public goods would seriously underestimate the benet of the project. This is because migration
in response to a new public good reduces the di¤erences in these outcomes across areas. Using census
data from Nepal, this paper provides evidence on the extent to which access to public goods and services
inuences bilateral migration ow across areas.
The determinants of bilateral migration have been analyzed mostly in the context of international
migration (Grogger and Hanson (2011), Ortega and Peri (2013)) and inter-regional migration (Ghatak,
Mulhern and Watson (2008), Andrienko and Guriev (2004)).2 This literature however focuses primarily on
income and migration costs as determinants of migration ow. A recent literature examines how migrants
choice of destination is inuenced by locational attributes including the state of public infrastructure and
services. For a relatively richer developing country Brazil  Lall, Timmins and Yue (2009) nd that
poor migrants are willing to accept lower wages to achieve access to better services while richer migrants
are inuenced only by income di¤erences.3 Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) nd a statistically signicant and
numerically large e¤ect of access to paved roads on migrantsdestination choice in Nepal: migrants prefer
a destination that is closer to a paved road. While contributing to this literature, the analysis in this
paper di¤ers from the above papers in a number of ways. Instead of focusing on the destination choice
of individual migrants, we analyze bilateral migration ows across multiple sources and destinations. Our
empirical specication is derived from a model of utility maximization by the migrants proposed by Ortega
and Peri (2013) and Grogger and Hanson (2011). We consider a generalized nested logit model where
migrants rst decide whether to migrate and then decide among the potential destinations. The advantage
of this approach is that the resulting empirical specication includes a correction term for the unobserved
heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants. The above mentioned papers (Fafchamps and Shilpi
(2013), Lall, Timmins and Yue (2009)) in contrast side-stepped the issue of migrantsnon-random selection
2For a survey of migration literature, please see Greenwood (1975) and Borjas (1994).
3For example, a Brazilian minimum wage worker earning R$7 an hour was willing to pay R$420 a year to have access to
better health services, R$87 for a better water supply, and R$42 for electricity.
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by focusing on the choice of destination conditional on migrating. More importantly, we make a distinction
between the productivity and amenity values of basic infrastructure and services. For instance, access to
electricity allows rms to automate production, shifting the production possibility frontier ("productivity
e¤ect"). It also helps households to carry out essential chores e¢ ciently and to enjoy leisure more fully
("amenity e¤ect"). We develop a strategy to uncover the amenity values of infrastructure and services. The
strategy relies on a two-stage estimation procedure in which a canonical migration model ignoring access
to infrastructure and services is tted at the rst stage. The rst stage estimation thus allows income
to capture the productivity e¤ect of the public goods. To the extent these goods are targeted to more
productive areas, income in the rst stage estimation picks up that placement e¤ect also. In the second
stage, the residual from the rst stage is regressed on measures of access to infrastructure and services. By
construction, this strategy provides conservative estimates of amenity values of public goods.
The empirical analysis of this paper utilizes the detailed migration information from the population
census 2010 of Nepal. Due to the mountainous terrain of the country and limited agricultural potential
in many areas, migration is an important livelihood strategy for the Nepalese people. The rough terrain
makes the provision of basic infrastructure very di¢ cult with the outcome that large parts of the country
are not well served by transport infrastructure. Geographical coverage of electrication remains rather
low, serving only a third of rural households. In terms of access to infrastructure and services as well as
stage of economic development, Nepal is comparable to many Sub-Saharan African countries. The large
geographical variations in access to basic public goods along with vibrant migration ows make Nepal
particularly suitable for our study.
When a standard migration model is tted, our empirical results conrm the common ndings of the
migration literature that income and distance between source and destination are the two most important
determinants of bilateral migration ow. Consistent with the ndings of Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013),
we nd that when measures of access to basic public goods are added as regressors, the magnitude of the
income coe¢ cient declines substantially though it still remains statistically signicant. This result conrms
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that the income coe¢ cient in a standard migration model is likely to be biased upward. Our results show
that access to electricity and paved roads are important determinants of migration: migrants prefer areas
with better access to electricity and paved roads. The results from the two-stage estimation procedures
indicate that migrants attach substantial amenity value to access to electricity as well. Moreover, we
nd that migrants of di¤erent skill levels (primary, secondary and tertiary education level) attach similar
amenity values to access to electricity. Thus better access to electricity attracts migrants not only because
it brightens their income prospects but also because it o¤ers better quality of life to them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual framework and empirical specication
are presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4, organized in subsections, presents the
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.Conceptual Framework
2.1 The Model
We start from a simple model of migration where an individual makes a utility maximizing migration
decision among multiple destinations within the country. Individual h in her place of residence s decides
whether to stay at s or to migrate to any of i 2 I = f1; :::; Ng: Let utility of individual h in location i
be denoted Uhi . Following the literature, we assume that utility U
h
i is a function of the income y
h
i (or
consumption) that the individual can achieve in location i, of the prices pi he or she faces, and a vector
of location-specic amenities Ai (Bayoh, Irwin and Haab, 2006). The utility from migrating to a given
destination i depends on the migrants utility from income and amenities suitably adjusted for prices
[uhi (y
h
i ; Ai; pi)] and on the costs C
h
si of moving from s to i. Following Grogger and Hanson (2008) and
Ortega and Peri (2009), we make a distinction between factors that are shared by all migrants from the
same origin and to the same destination, and individual specic factors. The utility in destination i can
be expressed as:
Uhsi = si   hsi = u(yi; Ai; pi)  g(Csi)  hsi (1)
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where si is an origin-destination specic term shared by all individuals migrating from s to i and hsi
is the individual migrant specic term. ui(yi; Ai; pi) is the expected utility of individual h in destination i.
The expected permanent income of individual h in destination i is the average income yi: In the empirical
estimation, we allow di¤erences in incomes for workers of di¤erent skill levels. The expected utility in the
destination depends also on the services and amenities available there along with the cost of living. This
is important particularly for internal migration where individuals and households may move not only to
capture income gain but also to avail themselves of better services and amenities  for instance better
schools or health services at destination. Similarly, Csi is the average cost of migration from s to i. The
cost term Csi captures the physical distance between origin and destination. It also reects costs incurred
by individuals due to social distances (e.g. cultural, ethnic and language di¤erences) between the origin
and destination.
We assume that u is an increasing function of yi; and Ai; and a decreasing function of pi: We assume
that g is an increasing function of Csi: Following Grogger and Hanson (2008), we assume that both u and
g are approximately linear functions. In the case of no migration, the average expected utility is:
Uhss = ys + As   ps
where ;  and  are positive constants. The utility from locating in i can be expressed as:
Uhsi = yi + Ai   pi   Csi   hsi (2)
where  > 0 is a parameter. The individual specic term hsi denotes the idiosyncractic parts of the
utility and cost associated with migration by individual h. There is now substantial evidence that migrants
may be substantially di¤erent from non-migrants in terms of their ability, risk aversion and preferences.
Following Ortega and Peri (2009) we assume that:
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hsi = (1  )"si for i = s (3)
= h + (1  )"si for i 6= s
where "si is iid following an (Weibul) extreme value distribution. i is an individual specic term that
a¤ects migrants only and its distribution is assumed to depend on  2 [0; 1). Given that "si has an extreme
value distribution, then hsi has also an extreme value distribution (Cardell (1991). The migrant specic
term i does not depend on destination and can be thought of capturing the di¤erences in preferences for
migration.
Ortega and Peri (2009) show that utility maximization under the distributional assumptions leads to
the following condition:
lnSsi   lnSss    lnSiN = [yi   ys] + [Ai  As]  [pi   ps]  Csi (4)
where Ssi = msi=ns; Sss = (ns  
NP
i=1
msi)=ns;and SiN = msi=
NP
i=1
msi: ns is the total native born
population of s; msi is the migrants born in s and gone to destination i; and
NP
i=1
msi is the total migrants
from s to all possible destinations. Ssi and SiN are the share of migrants to location i in total native born
population of s and total migrants from location s respectively. Sss is the share native born population in
s who chose to stay in s. The expression in equation (4) is very similar to an expression under standard
logit formulation if  = 0: The term  in equation (4) corrects for the di¤erences in utility (due to income,
amenity, prices and costs) between migrants and non-migrants (Ortega and Peri (2009)).
Subsitutiting for shares and solving for the logarithm of migration ow (lnmsi), equation (4) can be
re-written as:
lnmsi = 1yi + 1Ai   1pi   1Csi +  s + si (5)
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where si is the zero-mean measurement error,  s is the origin xed e¤ects and 1 =

1  ; 1 =

1  ; 1 =

1  ; and 1 =

1  . In the standard logit formulation ( = 0); the xed e¤ects account for share of the
stayers in the population along with income, amenity and prices at the origin [ s = ln(ns  
NP
i=1
msi)].
When migrants di¤er systematically from non-migrants in preference and ability ( 6= 0);the xed e¤ects
include a correction term ( 1  ln
NP
i=1
msi) for the average unobserved heterogeneity between migrants and
non-migrants as well.
We estimate the specication in equation (5) for bilateral gross migration ows among districts in Nepal.
Following Grogger and Hanson (2011), we analyze sorting of migrants across destinations. Specically, we
analyze the variations in the skill mix of migrants to di¤erent destinations. We dene three groups of
migrants in terms of their education level: those with (i) less than primary education, (ii) education
between primary and secondary levels and (iii) above secondary level.
lnmjsi = 
j
1y
j
i + 
j
1Ai   j1pi   j1Csi +  s + jsi; for j = 1; 2; 3 (6)
where j represents the education levels of migrants. The specications in equations (5) and (6) are
based on a linear utility and migration cost functions. A linear formulation can be interpreted as monetary
income and cost whereas a log-linear specication would imply as log income and time cost (Ortega and
Peri (2013)). We performed estimation using both linear and log linear specications.
Equations (5) - (6) are the basis of our main empirical estimation. A number of things are worth noting
in the estimation of equations (5-6). First, when su¢ cient numbers of migrants come to a destination, it is
expected to have general equilibrium e¤ects on wages, incomes and access to services and amenities.4 This
would generate a potential endogeneity bias due to the fact that income and amenities in a destination
resulted in part from the decision of many migrants to locate there. To eliminate this bias, we use lagged
explanatory variables. More precisely, let T be the period for which we have information on explanatory
variables and T + t the period at which we observe migrants. Migrants are dened as those who migrated
4The e¤ect could be negative e.g., congestion or positive e.g., agglomeration externalities.
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between T and T+t whereas explanatory variables come from period T: Limiting the set of migrants in this
fashion ensures that migration decisions are based only on information available prior to migration. Second,
bilateral migration ows between districts are not always positive. While our main estimation focused on
districts with positive migration ows, we also checked the robustness of our results for the sample which
included districts with no migration ows. We weight observations by destination population which corrects
for potential heteroskedasticity of measurement error. The standard errors are clustered by destination
districts to account for within (destination) district correlation of errors.
2.2 Empirical Specication
The basic empirical specications estimated from the data augment equations (5) and (6) with additional
explanatory variables, leading to the following estimating equations:
lnmsi = 1yi + 1Ai   1pi   1Csi +  1Zi +  s + si (7)
lnmjsi = 
j
1y
j
i + 
j
1Ai   j1pi   j1Csi +  1ZJi +  s + jsi; for j = 1; 2; 3 (8)
where Zi is a vector of locational attributes of destination i. The Zi vector includes controls for social
proximity between source and destination in terms of language, religion and ethnicity. Following standard
practice in the literature, we also include a measure of the unemployment rate as a control.
Suppose 1 = 
j
1 = 0, then equations (7 and 8) have the specications that are comparable to specica-
tions derived from the standard model of determination of migration ows when migrantspreferences for
better access to public goods and services are ignored. For simplicity, suppose, yi and Ai are uncorrelated
with rest of the explanatory variables in the above equations and (1 6= 0; j1 6= 0):We estimate equation
(7) ignoring Ai: The estimated coe¢ cient of income in this case is:
1 = ^1 + ^1 (9)
8
where 1 is the estimated income coe¢ cient when Ai is ignored and ^1 and ^1 are the estimated income
and amenity/public goods coe¢ cients from the full specication (equation 7) and  is the correlation
between yi and Ai: Since income tends to be higher in areas with better public goods,  > 0: The income
coe¢ cient (1) thus overestimates the inuence of income di¤erences on migration ow (^1) when migrants
preference for public goods is ignored.
The positive correlation between income and public goods means that part of the preference for public
goods is due to a preference for higher income. Some of the basic public goods such as roads and electricity
have not only direct productivity and hence income e¤ect but also amenity values as they make life easier
for households. To explore the amenity value of these goods and services, we utilize a two-stage procedure.
At the rst stage, we t a standard migration model ignoring public goods, which allows income to pick
up the productivity e¤ect of public goods and services. At the second stage, the residual from the rst
stage is regressed on the explanatory variables representing access to public goods and services. Similar to
equation (9), it follows that:
1 = ^1   ^1
where 1 is the estimate of 1 from the second stage regression. 1 thus provides an estimate of the
amenity value of public goods and services to migrants.
3. Data
The empirical analysis in this paper draws data from various sources: the population censuses of 2000
and 2010 and the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2002/3. The migration data are collected using the
census long form for about 15 percent of the total population. This questionnaire collected information on
district of current residence, district of residence 5 years prior to the census, and district of origin. Detailed
information is also available on gender, age, education, religion, language spoken, ethnicity and motive for
migration. This rich data-set is used to dene the gross bilateral migration ows across districts.5
5Nepal is divided into 75 districts.
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The 15 percent sample of population census covers approximately 4.02 million individuals in 740,749
households. Because of our focus on adult migration, we restrict our attention to adults of age 15 and
above. Of the 4.04 million individuals, about 35 percent are children below the age of 15 years. Among the
adult population (about 2.65 million), about 18.7 percent are living in a district other than their district
of birth. Among the migrants, 34 percent have moved in the six years preceding the census, that is, in the
period between the 2002/3 NLSS and 2010 census. A large fraction of these individuals have moved for
reasons other than work. Marriage is the dominant reason for moving among women (40 percent); study is
the dominant reason for moving among children and youths (52 percent). In contrast, of the adult males
who migrated during the last 6 years, 54 percent moved for work reasons. We estimate the migration
ows among districts using the census data and appropriate population weights. We dene two types of
migrants: work migrants who moved to seek employment, and all migrants including work migrants as
well as those who moved for non-work related reasons. All estimations are carried out for both of these
samples.
Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of migrants in terms of district of residence and origin.
As apparent from Figure 1, a small number of destination districts have a high proportion of migrants. In
contrast, districts of origin are distributed widely across the country. This reects the fact that much of
the migration is from rural areas to towns and cities. Indeed more than 90 percent of the migrants come
from rural areas, and more than half of them migrated to an urban area. The same migration pattern is
observed for work migrants.
While the census provided information about migration, it did not collect any information on income,
prices and access to services and amenities. We utilize a nationally representative survey of households 
the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2002/3 to derive these explanatory variables. To estimate the average
income level in a district i, we ran a regression of the following specication:
yhi = i + x
h
i + v
h
i
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where yhi is the log of income of household h residing in district i, i is the district xed e¤ects, and x
h
i
is a vector of household level explanatory variables and vhi is the residual term. The regression includes
household size and composition (number of adult males, females and children) as explanatory variables
as larger households with more adults tends to earn more income and consume more; omitting them
would overestimate incomes in districts where households are larger, e.g., rural districts. Other household
characteristics are not included because they could possibly be a¤ected by migration. The estimated s
provide of average district income for all households. We also included controls for di¤erent education
levels to estimate education premia. Incomes for di¤erent skill categories are then computed using the
education premia.
In the empirical analysis, migration costs are captured by geographical and social distances. For ge-
ographical distance between districts, we utilize the arc distance between the district of origin and each
possible district of destination, computed from the average longitude and latitude of each district.6 We
expect the cost and risk of migration to increase with physical distance. Social distance captures the e¤ect
of migration networks which are found to be important in determining migration ow ( Munshi (1993),
Beaman (2012)). Social distance is measured by the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF). The
ELF index measures the probability that two individuals taken at random belong to the same ethnic or
linguistic group. We estimated ELF for each district using the method suggested by Alesina and La
Ferrara (2005). The ELF measures are dened for religious, linguistic and ethnic-caste groups using data
from the 2000 population census. We computed the district level unemployment rate from the census 2000
data.
Instead of using the share of households with electricity, we construct a measure of electricity connection
which does not depend directly on household income. We compute the share of wards  the smallest
administrative unit in Nepal that had electricity connection among all wards in a district using census
6The average longitude and latitude of a district are obtained as a weighted average of the longitude and latitude of all
the VDCs in the district, where the population of each VDC serves as weight.
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2000 data.7 This denition of access to electricity avoids the correlation with income that would have
resulted from the ability of households with higher incomes to get electricity connection had the access
variable been dened at the household level. As a measure of access to markets and other services (schools,
hospitals, etc.), we estimated travel time to the nearest paved road from NLSS 2002/2003 data. Travel
time to the nearest paved road correlates strongly and positively with other measures of access to services
such as travel time to schools, hospitals, local markets and formal banks.
To control for price, we use price of rice. Rice is the most commonly consumed food item in Nepal
and thus can be taken as a proxy for the price of common household goods. The NLSS 2002/3 collected
information on the quantity and price paid for rice by individual households. We use these data to compute
a unit price per kg.
We construct a measure of housing cost using data from the NLSS 2002/3 survey which contained a
separate section on housing. The survey collected information on hypothetical and actual house rental
values of each household together with house characteristics such as square footage, number and type of
rooms, quality of materials, and the availability of various utilities. We use these data to construct a
hedonic index of housing costs for each district. Let rki be the house rental price paid (or estimated) by
household h in district i and let xhi denote a vector of house characteristics. We estimate a regression of
the form:
log rki = ai + bx
h
i + e
k
i
where estimate of bai provides a measure the housing cost premium in each district i. In the regression
-omitted for the sake of brevity many of the house characteristics are signicant with the expected sign,
e.g., larger, better built houses with better in-house amenities are worth more. District price di¤erentials
are large and jointly signicant. Since the dependent variable is in log form, bai measures the housing cost
premium in each district.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables. On average about
7There are more than 35 thousand wards in 75 districts in our census long form sample.
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45 people migrated between a source-destination pairs. The number of work migrants is smaller about 19
people. Migration appears to be concentrated at the two ends of the skill distribution: both unskilled (up to
primary education) and skilled (above secondary education) tend to migrate at a higher propensity relative
to semi-skilled workers (above primary but up to secondary education). This is true for work migration also.
This pattern is consistent with the pattern observed for international migration into OECD countries. The
propensity to migrate into OECD countries is lower at the semi-skilled level (see Table 1 in Grogger and
Hanson (2011)). The median arc distance between source and destination is about 190 km. The average
travel time to the nearest paved road is about 7.4 hours indicating relative scarcity of paved roads in Nepal.
A large proportion of the country had no electricity connection in 2000, as only a third of the wards in a
district reported to have electricity connection. The ELF measures show that Nepal is characterized by
low religious diversity but by high ethno-caste diversity. The summary statistics of all other explanatory
variables are also reported in Table 1.
4. Empirical Results
The initial set of regression results using the specication in equation (7) are reported in Table 2. All
regressions reported in this paper included birth district xed e¤ects. All regressions are also weighted
using destination district population, and all standard errors are clustered at the destination district level
to account for any within district error correlations.
4.1. Determinants of Bilateral Migration Flow
We start with the simplest specication which corresponds to the standard specication estimated for
bilateral migration ow particularly in the context of international migration (Grogger and Hanson (2011),
Ortega and Peri (2013)). The estimation is carried out for two samples: all migrants, and work migrants.
The results for this specication are reported in columns 1 and 4 for the all migrant and work migrant
samples, respectively. Consistent with the overwhelming evidence from the migration literature, migration
ow appears to be associated positively with income at the destination relative to that at source. The
income coe¢ cients (columns 1 and 4) are quite precisely estimated. The estimated income coe¢ cient for the
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all migrants sample is slightly larger in magnitude than that for the work migrant sample but the hypothesis
that the two income coe¢ cients are equal cannot be rejected even at the 20 percent signicance level. We
introduced up to cubic terms of distance between source and destination, and all three terms are highly
statistically signicant in explaining variations in migration ow in both samples. The signs of the distance
coe¢ cients are consistent with a priori expectation: migration ow declines with an increase in distance
between source and destination. Among other explanatory variables, the ELF measures for language
and religious diversity have statistically signicant coe¢ cients though with opposite signs. The estimated
coe¢ cients imply that migration ow to a destination increases with language diversity but decreases with
religious diversity and is not signicantly associated with ethno-caste diversity. These results are consistent
with ndings for Nepal reported in Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013). The estimation results show that rice
price and unemployment rate do not appear to have statistically signicant association with migration
ow.
In the next specication, we introduce two measures of public infrastructure and services: travel time
to nearest paved road and percentage of wards electried. The estimated coe¢ cients of these two variables
have the expected sign (columns 2 and 5 in Table 2) and are statistically signicant at the 1 percent level.
The estimated coe¢ cients imply an increase in migration ow to a destination with a decrease in travel
time to paved roads and an increase in percentage of wards with electricity connections. Introduction of
these two variables led to a substantial decline in the magnitudes of income coe¢ cients: they are now
about one third of their respective magnitudes in columns 1 and 4. This conrms our a priori expectation
that areas with better access to infrastructure and services are also areas with higher incomes. Despite
smaller magnitudes, income is still statistically signicant in both the all and work migrants samples.
It is worth noting that the measures of access to public infrastructure and services (travel time to paved
road and percentage of wards electried) are dened from the NLSS 2002/3 and census 2000 data, whereas
migration ow is dened over the period 2004 to 2010. Thus for the migration ow under consideration,
measures of access to public goods are pre-determined. This helps us to avoid the problem of potential
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reverse causation where migration could induce investment in public goods. One remaining concern with
the estimated coe¢ cients of access to public goods and services is that they may be picking up the e¤ect
of unobserved locational heterogeneity. To redress this issue, we note that in a Roy-Roback model of
locational sorting, housing price captures the amenity/dis-amenity value of all location characteristics.
As noted by Bayer and Ross (2009), housing price can be taken as a summary measure of the relative
attractiveness of an area. We introduce log of housing price premium as a control for unobserved locational
heterogeneity where housing price premium estimates come from the NLSS 2002/3. The results from these
augmented specications are reported in columns 3 and 6 for the all migrant and work migrant samples,
respectively. The estimated coe¢ cients of housing price premium are positive and statistically signicant
in both samples suggesting that unobserved locational heterogeneity may be important in determining
migration ow. The estimates imply that areas with a higher housing price premia tend to receive higher
inow of migrants in subsequent periods. The estimates of income coe¢ cients have now become somewhat
smaller in magnitudes. The same is true for the absolute magnitudes of access to paved roads coe¢ cients.
The magnitudes of coe¢ cients of access to electricity on the other hand have increased slightly. More
importantly, none of the estimates are statistically signicantly di¤erent from their respective magnitudes
in columns 2 and 5. This suggests that the correlations between unobserved heterogeneity on the one hand
and access to paved road and electricity on the other hand are not strong enough to cause any substantial
bias in the estimates of coe¢ cients of the latter variables.
Among the other explanatory variables, we nd that unemployment rate has the expected negative
sign when controls for access to paved road and electricity, and housing price premium are added to the
regression. The coe¢ cient of rice price also becomes statistically signicant though with a positive sign.
Rice price is higher in urban areas compared with rural areas where it is grown because of transportation
cost. Rice price thus captures the fact that rural to urban migration is the predominant direction of
migration in Nepal. Finally, coe¢ cient estimates are statistically indi¤erent between the two samples. For
the rest of the paper, we thus limit our discussion to results from the full sample. In the next sub-section,
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we explore if the results are di¤erent for migrants of di¤erent skills.
4.2. Determinants of Migration for Di¤erent Skill Levels
The determinants of migration ow may be di¤erent for people of di¤erent skills. To the extent migrants
with higher education come from relatively well-o¤ families, they may face lesser credit constraint in
nancing their migration including the time spell during job search. On the other hand, poorer and
unskilled migrants may be pushed out of their source due to adverse shocks and hence their migration
may be less sensitive to income di¤erences. To explore these possibilities, we divide migrants into three
groups in terms of their education level. Skilled migrants are those with higher than secondary education,
and unskilled with primary or less education while semi-skilled belong to the middle group. We report the
estimation results for the regression specications in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2. The regression results
are reported in Table 3.
The overall results for all three skill groups are consistent with those reported in Table 2. Some
patterns are however worth noting. Income di¤erences between the source and destination seems to have
relatively smaller inuence on unskilled migrants compared with semi- and skilled migrants, though income
coe¢ cients are all positive and statistically signicant. The estimates of distance coe¢ cients on other hand
display the opposite pattern: they are larger in absolute magnitudes for unskilled and semi skilled migrants
compared with skilled migrants. This overall pattern is consistent with the expectations that many more
of the unskilled migrants are push migrants and that because of credit constraint, they tend to migrate
closer to their origin. Religious diversity a factor that may relate inversely to migrantssocial network 
matters much less for the skilled migrants.
Access to paved roads and electricity have statistically signicant coe¢ cients in all three samples. The
estimated coe¢ cient is positive for access to electricity and negative for travel time to paved roads. The
magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are largest for the skilled migrants who are supposed to be least credit
constrained. According to the estimates, unskilled migrants are less sensitive to access to paved roads
compared with semi- and skilled migrants: the absolute value of the coe¢ cient of paved roads for unskilled
16
migrants is about half the size of that for skilled migrants. On other hand, skilled migrants are more
sensitive to access to electricity compared with semi-skilled and unskilled migrants. The coe¢ cients of
housing price premium have the expected positive sign and statistically signicant coe¢ cients in all three
regressions. When these locational attributes are added to regressions, the overall pattern in the association
between migration ow and income, distance and other variables for the three groups of migrants remain the
same. Consistent with our earlier ndings, unemployment rate now has statistically signicant and negative
coe¢ cients in all three regressions. As before, addition of these location characteristics to regressions
leads to a signicant decline in the magnitudes of income coe¢ cients. While the income coe¢ cients are
still statistically signicant and have positive signs, their magnitudes are about a third of what they are
when access to public goods and housing prices were ignored. This again conrms that income and these
locational attributes are signicantly and positively correlated. To the extent access to paved roads and
electricity contributes to higher income, their respective coe¢ cients capture not only their amenity value
but also their productivity e¤ect reected in higher income. In the following sub-section, we attempt to
disentangle their amenity value.
4.3. Migration and Amenity Value of Public Goods and Services
To estimate the amenity value of public goods, we use a two-stage procedure. At the rst stage, we
estimate a standard migration model ignoring the di¤erences in the provision of electricity or paved roads
across areas. This specication thus corresponds to that in column 1 in Table 2, and columns 1, 3 and 5 in
Table 3. As shown in equation 9, the coe¢ cient of income in the rst stage regression picks up part of the
e¤ect of access to public goods and services. At the second stage, the residual from rst stage is regressed
on the locational attributes. As the rst stage regression purges the possible productivity e¤ect of public
goods, the second stage estimates thus provide measures of their amenity value. Income in the rst stage
may pick up more than productivity e¤ect: it may capture part of amenity value that is correlated with
productivity e¤ect. Thus second estimates can be considered as lower bound estimates of amenity values.
The second stage estimates are reported in Table 4. The estimates are given for the full sample as well
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as for unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled migrantssamples. For each sample, the estimates are reported
for two specications: one excluding housing price premium and the other including it. Regardless of the
specications, the estimates of coe¢ cients of access to electricity fall within a tight interval [0.987-1.215].
These estimates are also statistically signicant at 10 percent signicance level or less. The estimates of
coe¢ cients of travel time to paved road have the expected negative signs but none of them are statistically
or numerically signicant. The coe¢ cients of housing price premium are also not numerically or statistically
signicant for any of sub-groups of migrants.
The estimates for access to electricity suggest that migrants do attach amenity value to it. Even after
conditioning on income, migration ows are greater to areas which have better access to electricity. The
results in Table 4 also suggest no substantial variations in the way migrants of di¤erent skill types value
access to electricity as an amenity. The estimates of coe¢ cients of access to electricity in Tables 2 and 3 fall
within the interval of [ 2.5-3.12]. The estimates in Table 4 are much smaller in magnitude roughly about
40 percent of magnitude of estimates in Tables 2 and 3. In other words, of all the migration that happens
in response to access to electricity, 40 percent of those is perhaps due to electricitys amenity value.
The estimates in Tables 2 and 3 suggested strong and negative association between bilateral migration
ows and travel time to paved road, the estimates in Table 4 show absence of a signicant association
between these two variables. The strong and negative association between income and geographic isolation
(measured here by travel time to paved road) is well noted in the case of Nepal (Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008)
and (2013)). The lack of signicance of travel time to paved road in the second stage does not necessarily
imply that migrants do not attach any amenity value to access to paved road. Rather it suggests that the
correlations of travel time to paved road with income and with access to electricity are strong and that
given those correlations, it is not possible to disentangle the productivity and amenity value of paved roads.
4.4. Robustness Checks
We perform a number of robustness checks. These checks are conducted for all di¤erent samples. To
avoid clutter, we report the estimates of the coe¢ cients of access to electricity, paved road and housing price
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premium. We also report estimates from two regressions: a full model where all variables are introduced
simultaneously; and the estimates from the second stage regression where rst stage regression did not
include any of the three variables of our interest. The full model thus corresponds to specications whose
results are reported in column 3 of Table 2 and columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3. The conditional estimates
from second stage correspond to results reported in the even numbered columns of Table 4. We report the
results for all migrants in Table 5.
The regression results reported so far come from specications where income and distance variables are
measured in levels. In most migration studies, these variables are often introduced in the logarithmic form.
The logarithmic form would imply a log-linear utility function which according to Grogger and Hanson
(2011) could be mis-specied leading to omitted variable bias. To avoid mis-specication, we estimated
the specication consistent with the linear utility function where income and distance enter the regression
equation linearly. In the rst robustness check, we estimate the regression in log-linear form with both
income and distance variables in logarithms. The estimates of parameters of our main interest from the
full and conditional (second stage) regressions are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5. The estimates
are similar in sign and magnitudes to those reported in Tables 2 and 4.
In the next couple of robustness exercises, we address the issue of potential measurement errors in income
estimation. The district level income estimates come from the NLSS 2002/3 data. Income estimates from
household surveys typically involve measurement error though NLSS 2002/3 is a nationally representative
survey. To check whether our estimates are sensitive to alternative indicators of income, we conduct three
robustness checks: (i) Instead of average income adjusted for household size and composition, we use
median per capita income at the district level as our income variable. The resulting regression estimates
are presented in columns 3 and 4. (ii) While past income from household survey may provide information
about potential income at the destination, migrants may not have adequate information on potential income
in all di¤erent destinations. An important source of information about jobs and incomes for migrants is
the past migrants from the same area. We take past stock of migrants who migrated more than 6 years ago
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normalized by destination population as an indicator size of migrantsnetwork and add this as a regressor.
The results from these regressions are reported in columns 5 and 6. (iii) Incomes across geographical
locations are found to be highly correlated with population with income being higher in more populated
areas. Population density on the other hand is outcome of migration as well as state of public goods. To
avoid reverse causation, we added log of population in 1991 as an additional regressor. The results are
reported in columns 7 and 8 in Table 5. The introduction of later two variables (past migrants stock
and population) renders income coe¢ cient smaller in magnitude and statistically signicant only at 10
percent level. However, the qualitative results with respect to access to electricity remain unchanged
in all of the robustness exercises. When stock of past migrants or population in 1991 are added in the
regressions, the magnitudes of coe¢ cients of electricity become somewhat smaller, yet they remain both
numerically and statistically signicant. The results regarding the signicance of access to paved road
as a determinant of migration ow become much weaker when past migrants network or past population
are added in the regressions. Similar to income, stock of past migrants and population seem to be highly
and positively correlated with travel time to paved road. However, the results regarding its amenity value
remains unchanged.
In the main regressions, we focused on the sample of all districts with positive migration ows. In the
next robustness check, we included all districts including those with zero migration ow. The results are
shown in the nal two columns of Table 5. The results for this expanded sample is nearly indistinguishable
to those reported in Tables 2 and 4.
We repeated the robustness checks for migrants of di¤erent skill levels. The results are similar to those
reported in Table 5. In the upper panel of Table 6, we report the results when stock of past migrants is
included as an additional regressor. The lower panel reports the results with log of 1991 population as
an additional regressor. The results are comparable to those for the full sample. Though the magnitudes
of coe¢ cients of access to electricity are somewhat smaller compared with those in Table 4, they are all
numerically and statistically signicant. As before, we nd that coe¢ cients of travel time to paved road
20
become statistically insignicant when population is added as a regressor. In all other cases, migration
ow seems to respond signicantly with access to paved road in the full regression.
It is worth noting that population of a district captures the relative degree of urbanization as well:
districts with larger urban share also have higher population. Since urban areas di¤er distinctly from rural
areas in terms of income and access to public goods, introduction of population in the regression leads to
a substantial decline in the magnitudes of coe¢ cients of these variables. Thus inclusion of population as a
regressor is likely to bias the estimates of income and public goods coe¢ cients downward. Same argument
can be made about stock of past migrants. Our preferred specications thus exclude these two variables.
4.5. Economic Signicance
The explanatory variables in the regressions are measured in di¤erent units and thus it is di¢ cult
to compare the magnitudes of coe¢ cients of di¤erent variables. To provide an idea about the relative
importance of di¤erent factors in determining migration ows, we provide the estimates of the elasticities
based on the estimated coe¢ cients which are reported in Table 7.
We computed elasticities for both the full model which included all explanatory variables simultaneously
and the two stage procedure which excluded access to paved road and electricity and housing price premium
from the rst stage regression. In both models, distance between the source and destination is the most
important regressor in terms of the magnitude of its e¤ect on migration. In the full model, other important
factors in terms of magnitudes are access to electricity and rice price. Income is also important along with
language diversity and access to paved roads, but its magnitude is relatively small implying an increase
of migration ow by about 0.4 percent in response to a one percent increase in income. When income is
allowed to pick up the e¤ect of infrastructure and services, we nd income to be one of the most important
determinant of migration ow next only to distance in terms of magnitude of e¤ect. Even after allowing
income to pick up part of the e¤ect of access to electricity, access to electricity still remains as an important
determinant of migration ow. Interpreting the second stage coe¢ cient as capturing the amenity value,
the elasticity of migration with respect to electricity in the second stage conrms that migrants do assign
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considerable value to access to electricity as an amenity. Our nding regarding access to electricity is
consistent with that of Lall, Timmins and Yue (2009). However, unlike Lall, Timmins and Yue (2009) who
nd access to electricity to be valued only by the poorer households, our results suggest that its amenity
value does not vary across skill groups of migrants. This is perhaps due to the fact that access to electricity
is still limited in Nepal with only a third of wards reporting to have access. In contrast, Brazil has nearly
universal geographical coverage for electricity (97 percent of rural areas), and the access issue there is more
of nancial ability to get an electricity connection and paying bills.
5. Conclusions
In the standard new economic geography models, labor is assumed to be mobile in the medium to
longer term (Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)). With labor mobility, any regionally targeted policy
intervention in these models induces labor movement so as to restore spatial equilibrium. Evaluation of
large public investment projects such as transportation, electrication and communication on the other
hand tends to use spatial variations in outcomes and treatments to estimate returns while ignoring the labor
mobility issue. In this paper, we provide evidence on the response of migration to public infrastructure
and services using census and household data from a poor developing country, Nepal.
The empirical analysis of this paper incorporates several improvements over the existing literature on
the determinants of internal and international migration. The standard model of migration estimated
mostly for international migration tends to ignore the role of access to public goods and services in the
migration decision. Our conceptual model and empirical estimation show that such model tends to over-
estimate the importance of income in the determination of migration ow due to the positive correlation
between income and provision of public goods. Second, while the empirical studies focusing on migrants
destination choice do pay attention to spatial di¤erences in the provision of public goods, they tend to
side-step the issue of migrantsnon-random selection. There is now a large literature that demonstrates
clearly that migrants tend to be di¤erent from non-migrants in terms of both observables and unobservables
(Gabriel and Schmitz (1995), Dahl (2002), Akee (2006), Mckenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2010)). Using
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a nested logit model of utility maximization by the migrants as suggested by Ortega and Peri (2013)
 we derive an empirical specication which corrects for the heterogeneity between migrants and non-
migrants. Third, we make a distinction between the productivity and hence income e¤ect, and amenity
value of basic infrastructure such as electrication. The income e¤ect arises from its direct e¤ect on
rm and farm productivity whereas the amenity value derives from its use in household activities (e.g.
chores/studying/entertainment). Using the correlation between income and access to these public goods,
we develop a strategy to provide conservative estimates of their amenity values.
The empirical results show that migrants prefer areas which are nearer to their birth place and have
higher income, better access to electricity and paved roads, higher rice and housing prices and greater
language diversity. Consistent with the ndings of Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013), we nd that when mea-
sures of access to basic public goods are added as regressors, the magnitude of income coe¢ cient declines
substantially though it still remains statistically signicant. This result conrms that the income coe¢ cient
in a standard migration model might be biased upward. We nd some heterogeneity in the way income,
distance and access to a paved road inuence migration for di¤erent skill groups: more skilled migrants are
more responsive to income and access to paved road but less responsive to distance relative to unskilled
migrants. The results from the two-stage estimation procedure indicate that migrants attach substantial
amenity value to access to electricity. Migrants of di¤erent skill levels (primary, secondary and tertiary
education level) appear to attach similar amenity values to access to electricity. The results suggest that
better access to electricity attracts migrants not only for its positive productivity and income e¤ect but
also for its amenity value.
The main nding of this paper that migrants do respond to access to public goods has important im-
plications for the placement and evaluation of basic public infrastructure and services. While geographical
coverage of these public goods should be universal, budget constraints often force governments to prioritize
their roll out. Our empirical results suggest that governments can perhaps give more weight to cost con-
siderations in prioritizing the roll out. Our results also suggest that impact evaluation of public investment
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should pay particular attention to spill-over e¤ects to non-treatment areas due to migration. Such spill-over
e¤ects can in turn lead to substantial downward bias in the estimates of returns to public investment when
its e¤ect on migration is ignored in the evaluation studies.
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Figure 1: In and Out- Migration by districts in Nepal, 2011 
  
 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Median 
Stand. 
Dev. N 
Bilateral Flow of  
          All Migrants 45.29 5.00 152.81 3434 
     All Skilled Migrants 14.30 1.00 50.05 3434 
     All Semi-Skilled Migrants 11.50 1.00 38.99 3434 
     All Un-Skilled Migrants 19.49 2.00 72.21 3434 
Bilateral Flow of  
         All Work Migrants 18.64 3.00 58.04 2834 
     All Skilled Work Migrants 6.89 1.00 24.36 2834 
     All Semi-Skilled Work Migrants 4.57 0.99 15.80 2834 
     All Un-Skilled Work Migrants 7.18 2.00 21.12 2834 
     Monthly Household Income (Rs 000) 1.33 1.29 0.63 3434 
Price of Rice (Rs per kg) 21.43 19.46 6.20 3434 
Unemployment Rate 1.62 1.57 0.79 3434 
Ethno-Language Fractionalization Index: 
Language 0.45 0.48 0.22 3434 
Ethno-Language Fractionalization Index: Religion 0.28 0.28 0.17 3434 
Ethno-Language Fractionalization Index: Caste 0.82 0.83 0.11 3434 
Distance between source and destination (km) 236 190 168 3434 
Proportion of wards with Electricity 0.35 0.33 0.22 3434 
Travel time to nearest paved road (hour) 7.43 1.66 12.68 3434 
Log(housing price premium) 1.63 1.78 0.80 3434 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Migration Flow: Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Log(All Migrants) Log(All Work Migrants) 
        
   Income 1.234*** 0.383** 0.314* 1.021*** 0.323** 0.281** 
 
(3.796) (2.200) (1.954) (3.752) (2.133) (1.995) 
Price of Rice 0.0336 0.110*** 0.0954** 0.0420* 0.111*** 0.100*** 
 
(1.283) (2.949) (2.621) (1.844) (3.232) (2.984) 
Unemployment Rate 0.157 -0.158 -0.219** 0.0806 -0.208* -0.258** 
 
(0.891) (-1.410) (-2.231) (0.534) (-1.865) (-2.560) 
ELF-Language 3.144*** 1.802*** 1.546*** 2.727*** 1.605*** 1.411*** 
 
(7.350) (3.070) (2.792) (6.741) (3.143) (2.847) 
ELF-Religion -2.205*** -2.098** -1.740** -2.118*** -2.145** -1.915** 
 
(-2.764) (-2.285) (-2.003) (-3.074) (-2.642) (-2.469) 
ELF-Caste/Ethnicity -0.451 0.344 0.632 -0.0888 0.774 1.040 
  (-0.310) (0.175) (0.333) (-0.0638) (0.404) (0.557) 
Proportion of wards with 
Electricity   2.853*** 3.125*** 
 
2.314*** 2.515*** 
  
(4.191) (4.896) 
 
(3.734) (4.265) 
Travel time to nearest 
paved road 
 
-0.0397*** -0.0370*** 
 
-0.0352*** -0.0336** 
  
(-2.728) (-2.651) 
 
(-2.708) (-2.628) 
Log(housing price 
premium) 
  
0.273*** 
  
0.191* 
      (2.688)     (1.952) 
Distance  -0.0313*** -0.0319*** -0.0317*** -0.0259*** -0.0267*** -0.0268*** 
 
(-16.29) (-17.38) (-17.16) (-16.54) (-18.25) (-18.14) 
Distance Squared/1000 0.0699*** 0.0713*** 0.0707*** 0.0579*** 0.0599*** 0.0602*** 
 
(11.93) (12.70) (12.42) (11.81) (12.32) (12.28) 
Distance Cubed/1000000 -0.0507*** -0.0521*** -0.0517*** -0.0421*** -0.0437*** -0.0441*** 
 
(-10.11) (-11.45) (-10.96) (-9.760) (-10.12) (-10.16) 
Intercept 2.724 1.951 1.648 1.792 0.969 0.718 
  (1.555) (0.941) (0.832) (1.161) (0.491) (0.376) 
Observations 3,434 3,434 3,434 2,834 2,834 2,834 
R-squared 0.658 0.733 0.741 0.617 0.685 0.690 
Note: All regressions include birth district fixed effects and weighted using destination population. All 
standard errors are clustered at destination district level. ELF: Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Determinants of Migration Flow by Skill Groups: Regression Results 
 
Log(All Migrants) 
 
Unskilled Semi-Skilled Skilled 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income 0.963*** 0.246** 1.017*** 0.267** 1.236*** 0.328* 
 
(3.559) (2.220) (3.719) (2.127) (3.635) (1.973) 
Price of Rice 0.0301 0.0653** 0.0330 0.0872*** 0.0447* 0.113*** 
 
(1.374) (2.194) (1.499) (2.794) (1.709) (2.981) 
Unemployment Rate 0.146 -0.132* 0.0956 -0.193** 0.175 -0.185* 
 
(1.160) (-1.852) (0.688) (-2.331) (0.974) (-1.734) 
ELF-Language 2.541*** 1.304*** 2.463*** 1.230*** 2.779*** 1.268** 
 
(7.304) (2.947) (6.592) (2.769) (6.272) (2.372) 
ELF-Religion -2.284*** -1.912*** -2.031*** -1.722** -1.700** -1.270 
 
(-3.708) (-2.787) (-3.148) (-2.480) (-2.108) (-1.446) 
ELF-Caste/Ethnicity 0.296 0.998 0.499 1.260 -0.762 0.307 
  (0.240) (0.576) (0.402) (0.745) (-0.534) (0.168) 
Proportion of wards with 
Electricity 
 
2.558*** 
 
2.504*** 
 
2.925*** 
  
(4.857) 
 
(4.702) 
 
(4.656) 
Travel time to nearest 
paved road 
 
-0.0210** 
 
-0.0308*** 
 
-0.0401*** 
  
(-2.008) 
 
(-2.747) 
 
(-2.754) 
Log(housing price 
premium) 
 
0.169** 
 
0.156** 
 
0.267** 
    (2.301)   (2.039)   (2.616) 
Distance  -0.0327*** -0.0332*** -0.0298*** -0.0302*** -0.0275*** -0.0278*** 
 
(-17.13) (-17.82) (-17.70) (-18.62) (-15.32) (-16.34) 
Distance Squared/1000 0.0751*** 0.0762*** 0.0695*** 0.0703*** 0.0648*** 0.0653*** 
 
(12.27) (12.41) (12.59) (12.85) (11.71) (12.23) 
Distance 
Cubed/1000000 -0.0542*** -0.0553*** -0.0506*** -0.0515*** -0.0484*** -0.0491*** 
 
(-9.808) (-10.11) (-10.12) (-10.59) (-10.23) (-11.03) 
Intercept 2.172 1.656 1.191 0.412 1.344 0.150 
  (1.490) (0.922) (0.824) (0.236) (0.781) (0.0773) 
Observations 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 
R-squared 0.627 0.690 0.611 0.685 0.630 0.716 
Note: All regressions include birth district fixed effects and weighted using destination population. All 
standard errors are clustered at destination district level. . ELF: Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Amenity Value of Public Infrastructure and Services 
  All Unskilled Semi-Skilled Skilled 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Proportion of wards with 
Electricity 1.215** 1.184** 1.018** 1.013** 0.989** 0.987** 1.111* 1.077* 
 
(2.293) (2.364) (2.215) (2.269) (2.177) (2.233) (1.888) (1.967) 
Travel time to nearest paved road -0.00622 -0.00705 -0.00301 -0.00315 -0.00500 -0.00506 -0.00692 -0.00782 
 
(-0.472) (-0.551) (-0.309) (-0.330) (-0.468) (-0.483) (-0.542) (-0.637) 
Log(housing price premium) 
 
0.0715 
 
0.0119 
 
0.00580 
 
0.0778 
    (0.520)   (0.119)   (0.0552)   (0.572) 
Note: All standard errors are clustered at destination district level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness Checks 
  Log(Migrants) 
  
Log-linear 
Specification 
Median Per Capita 
Income 
Migrants' Stock at 
destination Ln(population91) Expanded  sample 
 
Full 
2nd 
stage Full 
2nd 
stage Full 
2nd 
stage Full 
2nd 
stage Full 
2nd 
stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Log-linear 
Specification 
          Proportion of wards 
with Electricity 3.308*** 1.590** 3.140*** 1.325*** 2.568*** 0.919** 2.713*** 0.736** 3.084*** 1.334** 
 
(5.169) (2.477) (5.251) (3.063) (4.561) (2.171) (4.308) (2.368) (5.153) (2.413) 
Travel time to nearest 
paved road -0.0405** -0.0103 
-
0.0319** -0.00437 -0.0338*** -0.00673 -0.0132 0.000572 
-
0.0356*** -0.00563 
 
(-2.562) (-1.181) (-2.247) (-0.462) (-2.746) (-0.651) (-0.928) (0.0585) (-2.815) (-0.453) 
Log(housing price 
premium) 0.304*** 0.0815 0.272** 0.0711 0.240*** 0.0732 0.325*** 0.186 0.207** 0.0565 
  (2.991) (0.548) (2.592) (0.463) (2.676) (0.638) (3.193) (1.650) (2.589) (0.529) 
Note: All regressions include birth district fixed effects and weighted using destination population. All standard errors are clustered at destination 
district level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Robustness Checks (Skill Levels) 
 
Unskilled Semi-Skilled Skilled 
 
Full 
2nd 
stage Full 
2nd 
stage Full 
2nd 
stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Migrants' Stock at destination 
      Proportion of wards with 
Electricity 1.909*** 0.721** 1.883*** 0.712* 2.365*** 0.821* 
 
(4.377) (1.995) (4.296) (1.964) (4.303) (1.717) 
Travel time to nearest paved 
road -0.0171** -0.00269 -0.0272*** -0.00474 -0.0369*** -0.00757 
 
(-2.001) (-0.390) (-2.954) (-0.600) (-2.817) (-0.764) 
Log(housing price premium) 0.131** 0.0133 0.120* 0.00710 0.234** 0.0794 
  (2.248) (0.179) (1.913) (0.0878) (2.588) (0.695) 
Ln(population91) 
      Proportion of wards with 
Electricity 2.238*** 0.661** 2.172*** 0.622** 2.486*** 0.644** 
 
(4.369) (2.413) (4.268) (2.285) (4.058) (2.028) 
Travel time to nearest paved 
road -0.00259 0.00284 -0.0116 0.00123 -0.0145 
-
0.000297 
 
(-0.263) (0.389) (-1.088) (0.159) (-1.057) (-0.0305) 
Log(housing price premium) 0.209*** 0.0989 0.198** 0.0992 0.323*** 0.192* 
  (2.764) (1.237) (2.535) (1.169) (3.133) (1.735) 
Note: All regressions include birth district fixed effects and weighted using destination population. All 
standard errors are clustered at destination district level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Relative Magnitudes of Estimated Coefficients 
  Coefficient Estimates Elasticity 
 
Full First Second  Full First Second  
  Model Stage Stage Model Stage Stage 
Income 0.314* 1.234*** 
 
0.418 1.642 
 Price of Rice 0.0954** 0.0336 
 
2.044 0.720 
 Unemployment Rate -0.219** 0.157 
 
-0.356 0.255 
 ELF-Language 1.546*** 3.144*** 
 
0.689 1.402 
 ELF-Religion -1.740** -2.205*** 
 
-0.490 -0.621 
 ELF-Caste/Ethnicity 0.632 -0.451   0.516 -0.368   
Proportion of wards with 
Electricity 3.125*** 
 
1.184** 1.097 
 
0.416 
Travel time to nearest paved road -0.0370*** 
 
-0.00705 -0.275 
 
-0.052 
Log(housing price premium) 0.273***   0.0715 0.273   0.072 
Distance  -0.0317*** -0.0313*** 
 
-7.478 -7.384 
 Distance Squared/1000 0.0707*** 0.0699*** 
 
5.925 5.858 
 Distance Cubed/1000000 -0.0517*** -0.0507*** 
 
-1.949 -1.912 
 Total Distance Effect       -3.503 -3.438   
Note: All regressions include birth district fixed effects and weighted using destination population. All 
standard errors are clustered at destination district level. . ELF: Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
